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This paper introduces photosynthesis into the motion-equation of the atmospheric 
stock of carbon-dioxide as a counterpart endogenous factor to emissions of this 
principal greenhouse gas from lands occupied by humans. By doing so, the paper 
links the stock of atmospheric carbon-dioxide, hence climate-change and uncertainty, 
to the allocation of usable land to humans and forest. The public planners can control 
this allocation and, consequently, the atmospheric stock of carbon-dioxide, climate-
change and future usable land by setting land-rates in accordance with use. The 
analysis considers two types of land-use for expected utility maximizing humans and 
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The current trend of global warming is mainly a reflection of a chronic imbalance 
between the emission and recycling of carbon-dioxide. Since the beginning of 
agricultural settlements humans have contributed to this imbalance by clearing lands 
from the natural recyclers of this principal greenhouse gas and by burning fossil fuels. 
During the last 11,000 years the world forest-cover has been reduced from about 50 
percent of the Earth’s land to about 30 percent. About three quarters of this decline 
occurred in the last 200 years — a period dominated by coal, gas and oil fueled 
mechanization of production and transportation, which facilitated an unprecedented 
growth and spread of output and population. This process has intensified after the 
Second World War with the industrialization of developing countries. Evidently, the 
background atmospheric concentration of carbon-dioxide recorded since 1958 at 
Mount Mauna Loa, Hawaii, displays an oscillating trajectory, with peaks (troughs) at 
the end (beginning) of the plants’ active season, along an upwardly inclined convex 
contour, the Keeling Curve. When contrasted with deep historical data on carbon-
dioxide concentration in bubbles trapped in Antarctic ice-cores, the Keeling Curve 
reflects unprecedented levels and rates of accumulation of carbon-dioxide. Despite the 
globally growing concerns reported by Dunlap et al. (1993), Inglehart (1995, 1997), 
Diekmann and Franzen (1999) and Franzen (2003), the humans’ aggregate carbon-
dioxide emissions increased by forty-five percents and the world forest cover 
decreased at an average rate of about 8 million hectares per annum between 1990 and 
2010.  
While the equilibrium climate sensitivity to atmospheric greenhouse gasses is 
expected to be relatively small — about three degrees Celsius — the tails of the 
probability density functions of the surface-temperature change and damage are 
argued by Weitzman (2009, 2011) to be fat due to compounded uncertainty. In which 
case, wait-and-see is a high-risk strategy. Yet, remedial actions are impeded by the 
nature of the atmosphere. The atmosphere is an indivisible open-access natural 
resource. In the absence of property rights and clear identity of the sources of the 
stock of carbon-dioxide in any particular location, formation of markets for the 
aforesaid externalities created by this stock — global warming and climate change — 
is impossible. Economic analyses of the imbalance in the atmospheric carbon-dioxide 
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cycle and remedial policies have typically focused on human emissions of this gas 
and other greenhouse gasses. Following Weitzman’s (1974) seminal approach, the 
relative efficiency of quantity and price based instruments for controlling the 
atmospheric stock of greenhouse gasses have been analyzed by Pizer (2002), Hoel 
and Karp (2002), Newell and Pizer, (2003), Fischer and Newell (2008) and many 
other researchers. The implementation of these instruments involves large costs of 
monitoring emissions. It also requires international cooperation for sharing the burden 
and attaining globally significant outcomes (Levy, 2011).  
Unlike the atmosphere, land — the main platform of humans’ and plants’ 
activities — is divisible, controlled by states, and classified by type of use. Hence, 
controlling the use of land by land-rates (rental rates in the case of state ownership 
and tax rates in the case of private ownership) can serve as an alternative method for 
controlling humans’ carbon-dioxide emissions as well as plants’ photosynthesis of 
this gas. The large monitoring costs of carbon emissions from this divisible platform 
can be avoided by setting the land-rates according to use.  
This paper considers both humans’ emissions and plants’ photosynthesis as 
endogenous determinants of the atmospheric stock of carbon-dioxide and, 
consequently, global warming and climate change. The paper analyzes theoretically 
the division of usable land between the human emitters and the natural recyclers of 
this principal greenhouse gas, who are exposed to their imbalanced-interaction-driven 
climate change. While the habitat of the natural recyclers, forest, is confined to their 
initial endowment of land, humans can expand their control over the usable land by 
renting at a flat rate that varies with the type of use. Land is taken to be essential input 
in humans’ production and, for tractability, two types of use of land by humans are 
considered. The analysis regards humans as sophisticated rational beings. They take 
into account the effect of the usable-land allocation on the accumulation of carbon-
dioxide in the atmosphere and the effects of the consequent climate change on the size 
of the usable land, on the mean and variance of production, and on the mean and 
variance of the atmospheric carbon-dioxide photosynthesized by plants. These effects 
are described in section 2. In addition to income, humans’ expected utility is affected 
by their concerns about the accumulation of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere. As 
presented in section 3, the quantity of usable land rented is chosen to maximize their 
expected utility. The public planner controls the outcomes by setting the land-rates 
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according to use and technology. The effects of the land-rates and photosynthesis’ 
efficiency on the size of the forest are derived in section 4.    
 
2. Model specifications  
Two uncoordinated groups of human land-users are considered: rural dwellers 
(henceforth farmers) and urban dwellers (henceforth manufacturers). Each of these 
groups is assumed to be homogeneous with regard to preferences, ability and 
technology. With tS  denoting the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock in period t, tEF  
the farmers’ carbon-dioxide emissions in period t, tEM  the manufacturers carbon-
dioxide emissions in period t, tEW  the carbon-dioxide emissions by wildlife in period 
t, tQ  the quantity of atmospheric carbon-dioxide recycled by the forest in period t, 
and 0 1< δ <  the rate of decay of atmospheric carbon-dioxide, and with the amount of 
carbon-dioxide photosynthesized on farm-land by domesticated plants assumed to be 
negligible, the change in atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock in period t is expressed as: 
t t 1 t t t t t 1S S EF EM EW Q S− −− = + + − −δ .      (1) 
Because of increasing spread and frequency of climate-based disasters (e.g., 
floods, blizzards, frosts, hurricanes, cyclones, droughts and bushfires) the size of the 
Earth’s usable land decreases from a maximum L  with the divergence of the current 
climate from the ideal climate. For simplicity, the ideal climate is taken to be the same 
for farmers, manufacturers and forests. The divergence from the ideal climate is 
driven by the deviation of the current atmospheric stock of carbon-dioxide from the 
level associated with the ideal climate, S . With a computationally convenient 
quadratic representation of this deviation and with 0µ >  indicating the usable-land-




1 (S S)− −
=
+µ −
.          (2) 
Some of the usable land is held by fN  identical (for simplicity) farmers, each 
renting an equal amount of land ( f ) at a flat land-rate of hr  dollars per acre, and by 
mN  identical (for simplicity) manufacturers, each renting an equal amount of land 
( m ) at a flat land-rate of mr dollars per acre. The rest of the usable land ( nL ) is 
covered by undomesticated plants; namely, forest: 
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nt t 1 f ft m mtL L N N−= − −  .         (3) 
With the quantity of carbon-dioxide emitted by each acre used by farmers and 
manufacturers assumed to be f 0α >  and m 0α > , respectively, the aggregate 
emissions of carbon-dioxide by humans at t are 
t t f f ft m m mtEF EM N N+ = α + α  .         (4) 
Farming, manufacturing and photosynthesis are not performed in fully 
controlled environments and all lands are assumed to be exposed to the same climate-
based random disturbances. A deviation from S  leads to climate deterioration and, 
thereby, decline in productivity. With fβ  indicating the average productivity of the 
land used by farmers under ideal climate and f 0θ >  the sensitivity of per acre farm-
output mean to a divergence from the ideal climate, each farmer’s output in period t 







= + ε + θ − 
          (5) 
where tε  denotes the climate-based random disturbance. This disturbance is assumed 
to be normally distributed with zero mean and a variance, 2tσ , that increases with the 
divergence from the climate-wise ideal atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock: 
2 2 2
t t 1[1 (S S) ]−σ = σ + γ − .         (6) 
The positive scalar 2σ  indicates the random disturbance’s variance under ideal 
climate, and 0γ >   the sensitivity of the per acre farm-output variance to a divergence 
from the ideal climate.  
The activities of the other two land-occupants considered in this model are 
affected by the common random disturbance, tε , in different intensities. As 
manufacturing is performed in a better controlled environment than farming, the 
effect of the common random disturbance on manufacturing production is lower. By 
letting the relative effect on manufacturing be indicated by 0 1< ω< , the random 
disturbance in manufacturing is indicated by 2 2t t(0, )ωε ω σN . With mβ  indicating 
the mean output per acre held by manufacturers under ideal climate and m 0θ >  the 
sensitivity of per acre manufacturing output mean to a divergence from the ideal 








= +ωε + θ − 
 .        (7) 
 By letting the relative effect of the common disturbance on undomesticated 
plants’ activity be indicated by 0ψ > , the random disturbance in photosynthesis can 
be indicated by 2 2t t(0, )ψε ψ σN . With 0ϕ >  indicating the per acre 
photosynthesis mean under ideal climate and 0η >  the sensitivity of per acre 
photosynthesis-mean to a divergence from the ideal climate, the quantity of 
atmospheric carbon-dioxide  photosynthesized by the forest in period t is:  
t t t 1 f f m m2
t 1
Q (L N N )
1 (S S) −−
 ϕ
= +ψε − − + η − 
   .      (8)  
 The substitution of (4) and (8) into (1) implies 
t t 1 f f f m m m t t t 1 f f m m t 12
t 1
S S N N EZ (L N N ) S
1 (S S)− − −−
 ϕ
− = α + α + − +ψε − + −δ + η − 
   
            .(9) 
As it is not the focus of the paper, and for simplicity, the effect of climate change on 
all other forms of wildlife is ignored and tEW  is taken to be exogenous. 
 
3. Uncoordinated land distribution with expected utility maximizing humans 
Farmers’ and manufacturers’ utilities at period t ( ftu  and mtu , respectively) increase 
with their disposable income and decrease with their concerns about a further rise at t 
in the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock, which is already above the optimal stock S . 
With the price of the farm’s product indicated by fp , and with f 0ν >  indicating 
farmers’ constant (for simplicity) marginal willingness to pay for avoiding a rise in 
the atmospheric stock of carbon-dioxide, each farmer’s decision problem is portrayed 
as choosing the parcel of land that maximizes his expected utility from his 
willingness-to-pay deducted personal disposable income, 





f f f ft m m mt t t 1 f ft m mt t 12
t 1
f ft t 1 f ft m mt f t
px r
1 (S S)
{N N EW (L N N ) S }
1 (S S)






= − + θ − 
 ϕ
−ν α + α + − − − −δ + η − 
+ − − − ψν ε

   
  
        (10) 
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µ = − + θ − 
 ϕ
−ν α + α + − − − −δ + η − 

   




2 2 2 2
x f ft t 1 f ft m mt f t 1[p (L N N ) ] [1 (S S) ]− −σ = − − − ψν σ + γ −   .                        (12) 
Following Freund’s (1956) convenient formulation of expected utility from a 
normally distributed income, let ft f ftu 1 exp( R x )= − −  and fR 0>  represent the 




x f x0.5Rµ − σ , where the second term can be interpreted as the farmer’s 
costs of risk bearing. Recalling (11) and (12), each farmer’s decision on land-holding 




f f f ft m m mt t t 1 f ft m mt t 12
t 1
2 2 2




N N EW (L N N ) S
1 (S S)







−  + θ −  
  ϕ −ν α + α + − − − −δ  + η −  




   
  
Since 2 2 2f t 1 f f fR [1 (S S) ][(p N ) 0−− σ + γ − + ψν < , the second-order condition for 
maximum is satisfied. From the first-order condition and equation (2), the expected 
utility maximizing land held by each farmer is 
* f
ft m mt2
f f f t 1
f f
f f f f2 2
f t 1 t 1
2 2 2
f t 1 f f f
L N
p N 1 (S S)
p r N
1 (S S) 1 (S S)
.





= −  + ψν +µ −   
 β ϕ
− −ν α + + θ − +η − +
σ + γ − + ψν
 
               (13) 
By symmetry, with similar assumptions about the manufacturers’ utility and objective 
and with mp  denoting the manufactured good price, the expected utility maximizing 





m m m t 1
m m
m m m m2 2
m t 1 t 1
2 2 2
m t 1 m m m
L N
p N 1 (S S)
p r N
1 (S S) 1 (S S)
.





= −  ω+ ψν +µ −   
 β ϕ
− −ν α + + θ − +η − +
σ + γ − ω+ ψν
 
                (14) 
With accurate expectations about the counterpart’s demand for usable land 
being assumed, equations (13) and (14) imply that the expected utility maximizing 
land per farmer and manufacturer are: 
f m m
f f f m m m*
ft 2
t 1f f m m
f f f m m m
f f
f f f f2
f t 1
f f m m
f f f m m m
N1
p N p N L
1 (S S)N N1
p N p N
p r N
1 (S S) 11
N N1
p N p N
−
−
    ψν ψν
−    + ψν ω+ ψν    =   +µ −   ψν ψν −     + ψν ω+ ψν    
  β ϕ
− −ν α +  + θ − + +  





f t 1 f f f
f m m
m m m m m2 2
t f f m t 1 t 1
2 2 2
m t 1 m m mf f m m
f f f m m m
(S S)
R [1 (S S) ](p N )
pN r N
p N 1 (S S) 1 (S S)
R [1 (S S) ](p N )N N1






 η − 
σ + γ − + ψν
    ψν β ϕ





m m m f f f*
mt 2
t 1m m f f
m m m f f f
m m
m m m m2
m t 1
m m f f
m m m f f f
N1
p N p N L
1 (S S)N N1
p N p N
p r N
1 (S S) 11
N N1
p N p N
−
−
    ψν ψν
−    ω+ ψν + ψν    =   +µ −   ψν ψν −     ω+ ψν + ψν    
  β ϕ
− −ν α +  + θ − + +  





m t 1 m m m
f ff m
f f f f2 2
f t 1 t 1m m m
2 2 2
f t 1 f f fm m f f
m m m f f f
(S S)
R [1 (S S) ](p N )
pN r N
1 (S S) 1 (S S)p N
R [1 (S S) ](p N )N N1






 η − 
σ + γ − ω+ ψν
     β ϕψν − −ν α +     + θ − +η −ω+ ψν    −  σ + γ − + ψν   ψν ψν −     ω+ ψν + ψν    
 .(16) 
The expressions in the large parentheses in the first terms on the right-hand 
side of equations (15) and (16) indicate positive marginal effects of usable land on the 
 9 
expected utility maximizing land holding of individual farmers and manufacturers. 
The expressions in the large parentheses in the second terms on the right-hand side of 
these equations reveal positive effects of the ratio of the self marginal net expected 
benefit to marginal risk on the expected utility maximizing land holding of individual 
farmers and manufacturers. The expressions in large parentheses in the third terms on 
the right-hand side of the said equations indicate negative effects of the ratio of the 
counterpart’s agent marginal net expected benefit to marginal risk on the expected 
utility maximizing land holding of individual farmers and manufacturers. 
Consequently, the effects of the model parameters L , µ , fα , mα , fβ , mβ , fR , mR , 
and 2σ  are clear. Both the farmer’s and manufacturer’s expected utility maximizing 
land-parcels increase with the size of the usable land under ideal climate, with self 
output per acre, with the counterpart’s emissions per acre, with the counterpart’s 
production sensitivity to climate change, and with the counterpart’s degree of absolute 
risk aversion. Their expected utility maximizing land-parcels decrease with the 
coefficient of the land-loss engendered by climate change, with self emissions per 
acre, with the sensitivity of self production to climate change, with the random 
disturbance’s variance under ideal climate, with self degree of absolute risk aversion, 
and with the counterpart’s output per acre. 
The directions of the effects of photosynthesis’ efficiency — the mean 
recycled carbon-dioxide by an acre of forest — on the farmer’s and manufacturer’s 
demands for land are not clear. The following propositions are obtained by 
differentiating (15) and (16) with respect to this factor.    
 













 ϕ ∂  + η −  
=    if 
2
f m m
t f f f f
2 2 2 2 2 2
m t 1 m m m f t 1 f f f
N
p N N .




   + ψν ν 


















 ϕ ∂  + η −  
=    if 
2
m f f
m m m m m
2 2 2 2 2 2
f t 1 f f f m t 1 m m m
N
p N N .




   ω+ ψν ν 
   σ + γ − + ψν σ + γ − ω+ ψν  
  
=  
The usable land reserved by the expected utility maximizing farmers and 
manufacturers for the forests is: 
* * *
nt t 1 f ft m mtL L N N−= − −   .                    (17) 
By differentiation and collecting terms, the following proposition indicates, as can be 
intuitively expected, a positive effect of photosynthesis’ efficiency on the land left by 
humans for forest. It further displays the factors comprising this positive effect and 
suggests that the effect of photosynthesis’ efficiency on the forest-land decreases with 
the divergence from the ideal climate, with the sensitivity of the per acre farm-output 
variance to a divergence from the ideal climate, with the random disturbance’s 
variance under ideal climate, and with the farmers’ and manufacturers’ degrees of 
absolute risk aversion.   
 






2 2f f m m
m m f f
f f f m m m
2 2 2 2 2 2
m t 1 m m m f t 1 f f f
m m f f
m m m f f f
L
1 (S S)
N NN 1 N 1
p N p N
R [1 (S S) ](p N ) R [1 (S S) ](p N ) 0
N N1





∂ + η − 
    ψν ψν
ν − ν −    + ψν ω+ ψν    +
 σ + γ − ω+ ψν σ + γ − + ψν
= > 







4. Policy implications for forests 
The public planner’s control instruments of the aggregate size of the forest in a world 
with uncoordinated expected utility maximizing human activities are the land-rates for 
farming and manufacturing. The objective, hence setting, of these use-based land-
rates is different from that of ad valorem rates, which fully, or partially, disregard 
negative external effects generated on sites. There may be various criteria for 
selecting these use-based land-rates. Similar to macroeconomic stabilization policy, a 
possible practical criterion is minimizing the variance of the atmospheric carbon-
dioxide stock while restricting the mean to be equal to a target level, tŜ . Using 
equation (9) and (6) to compute the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock’s mean and 
variance, the public planner’s decision problem under this criterion is formally 
expressed as  
* * 2 2 2
t 1 f ft m mt t 1
mtft(r ,r )
min {[ (L N N )] [1 (S S) ] }− −ψ − + + γ − σ                                             (18) 
subject to  
* *
f f f m m m2 2
t 1 t 1
t t 1 t 1 t2
t 1
N N
1 (S S) 1 (S S)





   ϕ ϕ
α + + α +   + η − +η −   
 ϕ
+ − + −δ = + η − 
 
               (19) 
where *f  is given by (15) and 
*
m  by (16). This problem can be numerically solved 
with calibrated parameters of an expanded version of the model to a larger, more 
realistic, number of land usages.  
 Regardless of the land-rates’ selection criteria, the combined effect of the 
policy instruments on the forest-land can be obtained by total differentiation of 
equation (17). With inter-sectoral mobility being taken into account: 
 
* *
* * *ft mtf m
nt ft f mt m f
f f f f
* *
* *ft mtf m
ft f mt m m
m m m m
N NdL N N dr
r r r r
N NN N dr
r r r r
 ∂ ∂∂ ∂
= − + + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂∂ ∂





             .(20) 
It is sensible to assume that f fN / r 0∂ ∂ < , m fN / r 0∂ ∂ > , f mN / r 0∂ ∂ >  and  
m mN / r 0∂ ∂ < , but moderated by costs of migration and adjustment. Since the total 
number of humans is fixed, f f m fN / r N / r∂ ∂ = −∂ ∂  and m m f mN / r N / r∂ ∂ = −∂ ∂ . In view 






* * *f t 1 f f f f
nt ft mt f
ff f m m







R [1 (S S) ](p N ) NdL ( ) dr
rN N1





   ψν −   ω+ ψν    
 σ + γ − + ψν ∂ = − − ∂    ψν ψν  −     + ψν ω+ ψν      
  





* *t 1 m m m f
ft mt m
mf f m m
f f f m m m
[1 (S S) ](p N ) N ( ) dr
rN N1





 + γ − ω+ ψν ∂ − − ∂    ψν ψν  −     + ψν ω+ ψν      
  
 
           .(21) 
The following propositions about the effects of each of the two policy instruments 
separately are obtained from (21) straightforwardly. 
 





* *f t 1 f f f f
ft mt
ff f m m
f f f m m m
NN 1
p N
R [1 (S S) ](p N ) N ( )
rN N1




   ψν −   ω+ ψν    
   σ + γ − + ψν ∂ = −   ∂    ψν ψν    −     + ψν ω+ ψν      
  
   
then the size of the forest-land increases, does not change, decreases with the land-
rate for farmers. 
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   ψν −   + ψν    
   σ + γ − ω+ ψν ∂ = −   ∂    ψν ψν    −     + ψν ω+ ψν      
  
   
then the size of the forest-land increases, does not change, decreases with the land-




The atmosphere is the recipient of both the beneficial and harmful gaseous emissions 
of the inhabitants of Earth. In addition to emissions from parcels of land used by 
humans, photosynthesis is incorporated into the motion-equation of the atmospheric 
stock of carbon-dioxide as an endogenous variable. By doing so, the stock of 
atmospheric carbon-dioxide is linked to the division of usable land between humans 
and plants. This division and, consequently, the atmospheric stock of carbon-dioxide, 
climate change and future usable land can be controlled by setting land-rates in 
accordance with current use. As can be seen from propositions 4 and 5, the farmer-
manufacturer expected utility maximizing land-parcel differential * *ft mt( )−   is crucial 
for evaluating the effects of the land-rates on the size of the world’s forest. As can be 
further seen from equations (15) and (16), the sign of the said land-parcel differential 
is not clear and may vary over time with as the stock of atmospheric carbon-dioxide 
evolves. Presently, the average land-parcel per farmer is greater than the 
manufacturer’s average parcel. But one may argue that with climate-change induced 
food-supply disruptions and shortages the level of this inequality and even its 
direction can change. The terms on the left-hand side of the expression in propositions 
4 and 5 are positive and f fN / r 0∂ ∂ <  and f mN / r 0∂ ∂ > . Hence, while the expected 
utility maximizing parcel of land per farmer is still larger than the manufacturer’s 
parcel (i.e., * *mt ft 0− <  ), the higher the land-rates, the larger is the forest. These 
positive effects of the land-rates on the forest-land are moderated by the agents’ 
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